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Abstract
We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter
11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to
traditional views of Chapter 11, equityholders and managers exercise little or no
leverage during the reorganization process: Seventy percent of CEOs are replaced in the
two years before a bankruptcy filing; very few reorganization plans (at most eight
percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule in order to distribute value to
equityholders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants
contained in DIP loans, such as line-item budgets. Unsecured creditors gain leverage
through objections and other court motions. We also find that bargaining between
secured and unsecured creditors can distort the reorganization process. A Chapter 11
case is significantly more likely to result in a sale if secured lenders are oversecured,
consistent with a secured creditor-driven fire-sale bias. It is much less likely when these
lenders are undersecured or when the firm has no secured debt at all. Our results
suggest that the advent of creditor control has not eliminated the fundamental
inefficiency of the bankruptcy process: resource allocation questions (whether to sell or
reorganize a firm) are ultimately confounded with distributional questions (how much
each creditor will receive), due to conflict among creditor classes.
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Two themes dominate traditional accounts of Chapter 11 reorganization.
First, managers or equity holders, or both, control the reorganization process.1
This is made possible by debtor-friendly features of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
and judges who are passive or biased in favor of continuation. Exploiting the
court’s protection, managers can entrench themselves and equity holders can
extract concessions from creditors in the form of deviations from absolute
priority. As a result, courts may permit reorganizations of firms that should
liquidate. The second theme, usually implicit in the literature, is that creditors act
as a unified constituency, usually in agitating for a quick liquidation. Together,
these traditional themes continue to influence the academic literature in many
areas related to financial distress.2
A recent wave of literature by academics3 and practitioners4 suggests that

Classic references are Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang,
Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganizations, 8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 253
(1992); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J.
127, 183 n.60 (1997) (“It is widely believed that debtor firms use their power to run their
businesses and to control the reorganization agendas to capture portions of the value
that creditors are legally entitled to receive.”); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political
Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 315-16 (1993) (“Typically,
the firm's prebankruptcy managers—agents of the equity investors and often equity
investors themselves—control both the firm and the reorganization process.”)
2 Recent examples include Viral Acharya, Kose John, and Rangarajan Sundaram, “CrossCountry Variations in Capital Structure: The Role of Bankruptcy Codes,” working paper
(October 1, 2005) (comparing the “equity-friendly” U.S. system and the “creditorfriendly” U.K. system). Structural models used in bond pricing typically assume a single
class of debt, with shareholders extracting surplus from the creditor in workouts or in
bankruptcy. See Pascal Francois and Erwan Morellec, Capital Structure and Asset Prices:
Some Effects of Bankruptcy Procedures, 77 J. Bus. 377 (2004); Mark Broadie, Mikhail
Chernov, and Suresh Sundaresan, Optimal Debt and Equity Values in the Presence of
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 J. Fin (forthcoming 2007) (modeling conflict between
equityholders and a single creditor in bankruptcy, but analyzing both equity and
creditor control).
3 Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751
(2002); David Skeel, Creditor’s Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,
152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 917 (2003); Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, Secured Party in
Possession, 2003 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 150 (Sept. 2003); Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun, and
1
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these themes—at least in large corporate bankruptcies—are outdated. During the
past decade, creditors with senior, secured claims have come to dominate the
Chapter 11 process. Much of this creditor control is exercised through pre- and
post-petition secured lines of credit, which limit the debtor’s access to cash and
impose strict requirements on business activity.5 Because of this control, it is
argued, we have seen a dramatic increase in the proportion of Chapter 11 cases
that result in piece-meal liquidation or a going-concern sale.6 Among large,
publicly-traded firms in Chapter 11, going-concern sales accounted for less than
twenty percent of cases filed during the 1980s.7 In 2002, they accounted for about
seventy-five percent of the cases.8
In addition to shifting the focus away from equity and managerial control
in Chapter 11, the recent literature also directs attention away from the unified,
single-creditor framework. The onset of senior, secured creditor control raises
issues of potential creditor conflict between senior and junior classes of debt. As
senior lenders have obtained control through pre- and post-petition financing,
junior lenders have used claims trading, committees, and other tactics to gain
leverage over the reorganization process.9 Junior lender activism has increased as
hedge funds and other investors have purchased the claims of bondholders and

Lawrence A. Weiss, “Destruction of Value in the New Era of Chapter 11,” working
paper (2008).
4 Harvey R. Miller and Shay Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable
Option for Distressed Businesses For the Twenty-First Century?, 78 Am. Bankr. L. J. 153
(2004).
5 David A. Skeel, The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 Card. L.
Rev. 1905 (2004); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1209 (2006).
6 Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673
(2003). See also Lynn LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and
Rasmussen’s The End of Bankruptcy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (2003) (noting the dramatic
increase in sales, but questioning inferences drawn by Baird and Rasmussen).
7 LoPucki, supra, at 648.
8 Id.
9 Chaim J. Fortgang and Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1990); Frederick Tung, Confirmation and
Claims Trading, 90 Nw. L. Rev. 1684 (1996); Frank Partnoy and David Skeel, The Promise
and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1019 (2007).
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similarly dispersed creditors who, in the past, did not participate actively in the
bankruptcy process.10
Our paper has two main objectives. The first is to provide systematic
evidence on the validity of these new themes—creditor control and creditor
conflict—in large, corporate Chapter 11 cases. Most of the existing evidence is
anecdotal, raising doubts whether a new perspective on the bankruptcy process
is necessary. Our second objective is to identify the effects of creditor control and
conflict on bankruptcy outcomes, such as the decision to reorganize or sell the
firm. Prior theoretical literature shows that manager-creditor and equity-creditor
conflict can lead to asset misallocation during the reorganization process. We use
our database to investigate whether a different kind of conflict—senior creditors
versus junior creditors—distorts outcomes in bankruptcy cases.

We investigate creditor control and conflict using a unique database of
Chapter 11 filings by large publicly-traded and privately-held corporations. A
preliminary examination of our data provides strong evidence that the
traditional view of Chapter 11 is indeed outdated. The traditional paradigms—
managers vs. creditors and equityholders vs. creditors—no longer characterize
the key tensions in large corporate reorganizations. We find that seventy percent
of CEOs are replaced within two years of the bankruptcy filing. This represents a
sharp increase over comparable figures reported in past studies and suggests
strongly that Chapter 11 does not provide a safe harbor for entrenched
managers. Additionally, we find that very few reorganization plans (at most
eight percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule in order to distribute value
to equity holders. In eighty-two percent of the confirmed reorganization plans,
equity holders received nothing.
We also find strong evidence that senior creditors obtain substantial
control through their loan agreements with distressed debtors. Seventy-five
percent of the bankrupt corporations obtained senior secured financing prior to

Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor
Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 Colum. L. Rev. 191 (2005); Eric B.
Fisher and Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of Corporate Bankruptcy
Practice, 25 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 24 (Dec./Jan. 2007).
10
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entering bankruptcy. Ninety percent of these loans were secured by a lien on all
of the corporation’s assets. After entering bankruptcy, the debtor corporations
obtained post-petition financing in seventy-six percent of the cases. These too
were secured by liens on all of the firm’s assets. More importantly, the vast
majority of the loans contained covenants imposing line-item budgets,
profitability targets, or deadlines for submitting a plan of reorganization. The
lender was generally free to seize collateral unilaterally—without first seeking
court approval—if the corporation violated any of these covenants.
Although senior secured lenders appear to exert significant control
through loan documents, we also find evidence of frequent creditor conflict.
Junior creditors, acting through an unsecured creditors committee, filed
objections in over 50 percent of the cases. Senior creditors too often filed
objections. In forty-six percent of the cases, pre- or post-petition lenders objected
to actions proposed or taken by the corporations’ managers.
Our analysis shows that creditor conflict has an important effect on
bankruptcy outcomes. We find a statistically significant, non-monotonic
relationship between the ratio of secured debt-to-assets and the resolution of the
case. When secured creditors are undersecured (their claims exceed the value of
the firm’s assets, making them the approximate residual claimants) and when
there is no secured debt at all (making the unsecured creditors the approximate
residual claimants), the cases are relatively long and more likely to result in a
traditional reorganization.11 But when secured creditors are oversecured (their
claims are worth less than the value of the firm’s assets), we expect to see—and
do see—a different pattern. In these cases, theory predicts that creditor conflict is
likely to be most pronounced. Oversecured creditors will prefer an immediate
resolution: their claims may be paid in full during a quick sale, even if the firm is
sold for less than its fundamental value; delay could hurt them if firm value is
volatile and deteriorates over time. Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, will
prefer a reorganization if it lengthens the case. If firm value improves over time,
these creditors keep most of the upside; if value declines, they share any losses

This is consistent with the idea that, in the absence of conflict, creditors value the
reorganization process as a means of alleviating liquidity problems. See Andrei Shleifer
and Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium
Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343 (1992); Robert Gertner and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy and the
Allocation of Control, working paper (Feb. 1992).

11
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with senior creditors. Consistent with this theory, we find that cases are more
likely to result in a sale when secured creditors are oversecured than when the
firm has no secured debt or has an approximate residual claimant, such as an
undersecured creditor.
Our bankruptcy outcome data is supported by the pattern of objections by
unsecured creditors. We find a similar non-monotonic pattern in the frequency of
objections to a sale by the unsecured creditors’ committee. Unsecured creditors
are least likely to object to a motion to sell the firm when there is no secured debt,
and when secured creditors are undersecured. This non-monotonic pattern of
objections is observable when taken over the entire sample, and when
conditioned on the cases that end in a sale. Taken together with our outcome
data, these results support the hypothesis that senior creditors have substantial
power to control bankruptcy outcomes and that they exercise this power more
vigilantly when delay poses a greater risk to the value of their claims.
Our findings show that creditor control is pervasive, and that creditor
conflict distorts economic outcomes in bankruptcy. A full analysis of the
efficiency of these changes in bankruptcy practice, however, is beyond the scope
of this paper. Our data do not permit us to conclude that creditor control
produces more or less efficient outcomes in bankruptcy than equity or
managerial control. Furthermore, as with most scholarship in this area, we focus
exclusively on dynamics during the bankruptcy process. We do not fully analyze
creditor and debtor behavior that precedes a bankruptcy filing. Greater creditor
control in bankruptcy, for example, could affect the behavior of equity holders
and managers prior to bankruptcy in ways we do not observe, such as delayed
bankruptcy filings.12
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the prior literature, 2
describes our database, 3 presents summary statistics, and 4 presents simple
measures of creditor control and conflict. In Section 5, we test the effects of
control and conflict on the reorganization process. Section 6 concludes.

12

For evidence consistent with this kind of behavior, see Adler, et al., supra, note 3.
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1. Prior Literature
The phenomenon of creditor control has been the topic of numerous
recent studies, some of them empirical.13 The dynamics of creditor conflict have
received comparatively less attention.
With respect to creditor control, several papers have documented the
frequency of DIP financing during the 1990s. In a study of publicly-traded firms
that entered Chapter 11 between 1988 and 1997, Dahiya, et al.,14 found DIP
financing in thirty-one percent of the cases, with the percentage rising to fortyeight in the mid-1990s. Carapeto,15 in a similar study, observed DIP financing in
forty-one percent of cases, with the percentage rising to a high of sixty-seven in
1996.16 Both studies found DIP financing more common among larger firms and
less common in prepackaged bankruptcies. They also report that, relative to
debtors without DIP financing, those with financing had faster cases and were
more likely to reorganize or merge with another firm than liquidate under
Chapter 7. Carapeto, however, also found that the probability of liquidation was
higher when the DIP loan gave the lender a priming lien.
These papers are important, but they tell us little about the terms of DIP
financing and why it is an effective tool of creditor control. Carapeto addresses
this issue in part, showing that one characteristic of DIP financing—whether the

See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson and Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially
Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 1005 (1994).
14 Sandeep Dahiya, Kose John, Manju Puri, and Gabriel Ramirez, Debtor-in-Possession
Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 259 (2003).
15 Maria Carapeto, “Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?”, working paper
(Oct. 6, 2003).
16 Other studies include Fayez A. Elayan and Thomas O. Meyer, The Impact of Receiving
Debtor-in-Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent
under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 28 J. Bus. Fin. & Acctg. 905 (2001); Sris Chatterjee, Upinder
S. Dhillon and Gabriel G. Ramirez, Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28 J. Bank. & Fin. 3097
(2004); Upinder S. Dhillon, Thomas Noe, and Gabriel Ramirez, “Debtor-in-Possession
Financing and the Resolution of Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations,” working
paper (1996).
13
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lender receives a priming lien—has an important effect on outcomes. We do not
know, however, whether other characteristics of DIP financing matter as well.17
The closest papers to ours in this respect are contemporaneous working
papers by Bharath, et al.18 and McGlaun.19 Bharath, et al. investigate the
determinants of absolute priority rule (APR) violations. An APR violation occurs
when a reorganization plan distributes value to junior interests even though
senior interests have not been paid in full. An APR violation in favor of
equityholders can be viewed as evidence of manager or equityholder control.
Similar to our study, Bharath, et al. find that APR violations were less common
during the early 2000s than they were during the 1980s. They hypothesize—and
present supporting evidence—that APR violations declined during the 1990s and
2000s because creditors exercised greater control, via DIP financing and other
tools, during the same period.
McGlaun uses bankruptcy court data (from PACER) to document
covenants in senior loan agreements and investigate the influence of senior
lenders on bankruptcy outcomes. He finds, similar to this study, a relationship
between the senior debt-to-assets ratio and the time to case disposition that is
consistent with a desire among senior creditors to resolve cases more quickly
when their claims are more at risk. But McGlaun does not find the statistically
significant, non-monotonic relationship we document below.
CEO turnover in bankruptcy has also received attention as a measure of
creditor control. Carapeto finds that turnover is higher among firms that receive
DIP financing, consistent with the notion of creditor control.20 Bharath, et al. find
that turnover rates in bankruptcy increased sixty-five percent between 1990 and

Chatterjee, et al., supra, catalogue the covenants in DIP loans to publicly-traded
corporations that filed Chapter 11 petitions between 1988 and 1997. Although they
compare these covenants to those in other credit agreements, the authors do not assess
the effect of these covenants on bankruptcy outcomes.
18 Sreedhar T. Bharath, Venky Panchapegasan, & Ingrid Werner, “The Changing Nature
of Chapter 11,” working paper (Univ. Michigan 2007).
19 Greg McGlaun, “Lender Control in Chapter 11: Empirical Evidence,” working paper
(Univ. Rochester 2007).
20 Carapeto, supra.
17
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the early 2000s.21 Among entrenched managers—those with significant equity
holdings—the turnover rate rose over two hundred percent, a change they
attribute to increased creditor control during the same period.22
Several scholars have examined CEO turnover preceding a bankruptcy
filing. Bernstein finds high levels of turnover during 2001: among publiclytraded firms in bankruptcy, about forty-three percent of their CEO’s were
replaced within two years of the filing.23 Oddly, this turnover rate is lower than
rates estimated by other scholars using data on cases filed during the early 1980s,
the heyday of management control. Gilson, for example, studied sixty-nine
publicly-traded firms that entered Chapter 11 between 1979 and 1984 and
estimated a turnover rate equal to fifty-five percent during the two years
preceding the bankruptcy filing.24 A similar rate, equal to fifty-three percent, can
be derived from LoPucki and Whitford’s study of the forty-three largest publiclyheld corporations that filed Chapter 11 petitions between 1979 and 1988 and
successfully reorganized.25

Bharath, et al., supra, at 18.
Id., at 22.
23 Ethan S. Bernstein, All’s Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate Governance
Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress, 11 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 298 (2006).
24 Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 247
(1989).
25 See Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. Penn. L. Rev. 669, 723-36 (1993).
We calculated this rate using the data reported in Table IV. The time window used by
LoPucki and Whitford begins 18 months prior to the Chapter 11 filing, which is slightly
shorter than that used by Gilson.
Turnover rates rise dramatically, of course, when the window is extended to include
post-petition events. LoPucki and Whitford, for example, estimate a turnover rate equal
to 91% based on a window beginning 18 months prior to filing and ending 6 months
after plan confirmation. Id, at 723. Using a similar window—beginning 2 years prior to
filing and ending at plan confirmation—Betker observed a turnover rate equal to 75%
among a sample of 75 firms listed in the Bankruptcy Datasource. See Brian L. Betker,
Management’s Incentives, Equity’s Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 68 J. Bus. 161 (1995). See Betker for additional studies of CEO
turnover in financial distressed firms.
21
22
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2. Data
We collected data on all corporate bankruptcies listed in the Bankruptcy
Datasource “Public and Major Company Database” during the latter half of
2001.26 This datasource is commonly used in corporate finance and is attractive
because it includes filings by both publicly-traded and privately-held firms. We
chose the latter half of 2001 because data for earlier periods are highly
incomplete and data for later periods suffer a censoring problem, because many
cases are ongoing.
Our sample includes 153 cases, listed in Appendix B. For each case, we
gathered information about the parent company and all of its subsidiaries in
bankruptcy. Our data sources were PACER, SEC filings, and the Bankruptcy
Datasource. PACER is our primary resource. Every bankruptcy court maintains a
PACER website, which contains the docket sheet for and, often, images of all
documents filed in a bankruptcy case. Because document images were
unavailable on a number of websites, our data are more complete for some cases
than others. Indeed, we focused on cases filed during the second half of 2001
because the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware began posting images
in July 2001.
In most of the analysis that follows, we will rely on information contained
in the court schedules, because they offer up-to-date information about the firm’s
capital structure when it files, including data on secured debt. Comparable
information is not available in SEC filings.
3. Summary Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present summary information about the businesses and
their experiences in bankruptcy. We see a dramatic change in capital structure as
firms approach bankruptcy. Table 1 presents statistics on the median firm’s
assets and debt holdings before entering bankruptcy. These statistics are based
on data for publicly-held firms; the data are drawn from Compustat and SEC
filings. In most cases, these data reflect the capital structure of a firm one or two
years before the bankruptcy filing. The median firm reported assets worth
The list of firms is available at http://www.bankruptcydata.com/findabrtop.asp. This
database includes bankruptcy filings by (i) all publicly-traded corporations and (ii)
privately-held corporations that issued public debt or were “deemed significant or
newsworthy.”
26
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between $123 and $151 million, debt of about $112 million, and secured debt
equal to $6 million. The bankruptcy schedules present a very different capital
structure: the median firm (publicly-traded or privately-held) reported assets
worth $66 million and secured debt of $35.7 million. Thus, we see assets drop
over sixty percent and secured debt rise nearly six hundred percent during the
one to two years preceding the bankruptcy filing.
Ninety percent of the firms entered bankruptcy with secured debt. Table 2
presents important variation in the value of secured debt relative to assets. In
forty percent of the cases, the total value of secured claims was equal to less than
fifty percent of asset value; in twenty-seven percent of the cases it ranged
between fifty and 100 percent of asset value; and in twenty-three percent of the
cases, secured claims exceeded the value of the company. In other words,
secured creditors were undersecured in nearly a quarter of the cases. Roughly the
same pattern emerges when we compare the claim held by the largest (or
“dominant”) secured creditor to the value of the firm’s assets.
Table 3 presents information about the bankruptcy cases. Ninety-five
percent of the cases were filed voluntarily by the debtors’ owners. All but three
percent of the cases were filed under Chapter 11.27 Among these cases, nearly
seventy-five percent resulted in a confirmed plan of reorganization; most of the
remaining cases resulted in dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7. Because we do
not have direct indicators of whether a plan was prepackaged, we assume that a
case involved a prepack if confirmation occurred within four months.28 Nine
percent of the Chapter 11 cases were prepacks.
The third panel of Table 3 illustrates the frequency with which Chapter 11
cases resulted in the sale or liquidation of the business. Across all filings, sale or
liquidation occurred in sixty-six percent of the cases. A traditional
reorganization—in which the distressed firm’s creditors retain stakes in the firm
and, often, become its new owners—occurred in thirty-two percent of the cases.

Bernstein reports the same percentage of involuntary filings in a study of Chapter 11
filings during 2001 by publicly-traded corporations. See Bernstein, supra, at 2 n.3.
28 This cut-off captures all but two of the cases identified as “prenegotiated” in Lynn
LoPucki’s WebBRD database. The two exceptions were cases with durations of 7 and 9
months, respectively.
27
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The final panel of Table 3 summarizes case duration. Across all Chapter 11
cases, the median duration to confirmation, dismissal, or conversion to Chapter 7
was thirteen months. This figure is somewhat misleading, however, because
many plans are “liquidating plans” that merely distribute the proceeds from a
going-concern sale that occurred months before. In these cases, the fate of the
firm (whether it would be reorganized or sold off) was decided long before a
plan was confirmed. The final panel of Table 3 illustrates this phenomenon.
Although we do not have the dates on which sales occurred, we do have the
dates when motions to conduct a sale were filed. Among firms that were sold off,
a motion to sell the firm was typically filed within the first two to three months
of the case.
4. Simple Measures of Creditor Control and Conflict
Creditor Control. We can measure creditor control directly and indirectly.
Direct measures include deviations from APR that favor equityholders and the
terms of post-petition DIP financing. An indirect measure is the frequency of
management turnover immediately before and after the bankruptcy filing. When
a firm is distressed, its creditors influence the choice of management. DIP loan
covenants, for example, routinely include provisions forbidding the debtor from
replacing a newly-appointed CEO.29
Statistics on CEO turnover appear in Table 4, which shows that seventy
percent of CEOs were replaced within two years of the bankruptcy filing. This
turnover rate is markedly higher than the rate (forty-five percent) among all
Fortune 500 firms during a comparable two-year period (1999-2000).30 It is also
significantly higher than the rate (about fifty-five percent) observed among firms
that entered bankruptcy during the 1980s. The frequency of turnover in our data
rises further, to about eighty percent, when we include CEO replacements that
occurred during the two years after the case commenced. This is undoubtedly an

Chatterjee et al., supra, at 3107, report that 95 percent of DIP loans contain covenants
forbidding changes in management, control, and ownership.
30 Steven N. Kaplan and Bernadette A. Minton, “How Has CEO Turnover Changed?
Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs,” NBER
Working Paper No. 12465 (August 2006) (the 45 percent figure was computed based on
Table 2; the average number of firms during 1999 and 2000 was 733; the total number of
turnovers was 328, which is about 45 percent of 733).
29
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underestimate, however, because we did not look systematically for post-petition
turnover.
If CEO turnover is a good proxy for creditor control, these data point to
pervasive control. To be sure, management turnover may be caused by dynamics
wholly separate from creditor control. Shareholders of a troubled firm may
replace the CEO because they hope new leadership will help the firm recover (or
because they hope to avoid creditor control, which may result if the firm becomes
further distressed). While we can not rule out shareholder-driven causes of
managerial turnover, the data suggest, at a minimum, that entrenched managers
are not able to use Chapter 11 as a safe harbor when their firms encounter
financial distress.
Direct measures of creditor control appear in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5
shows that deviations from APR—payments to shareholders when creditors
have not been paid in full—were rare, occurring in only eight percent of the
cases. This is a dramatic shift from the frequency of APR violations during the
1980s. In a study of publicly-traded corporations that entered Chapter 11
between 1979 and 1986, for example, Weiss31 found APR violations in seventyeight percent of the cases. He also found that equityholders received some
payment in eighty percent of the cases. That was true in only eighteen percent of
the cases in our sample. If APR deviations measure the degree of control
exercised by managers and equityholders, as is commonly thought, the patterns
in Table 5 show that these groups exercise little influence over the modern
Chapter 11 process. The patterns point instead to pervasive creditor control.
Table 6 documents the frequency and terms of pre- and post-petition
financing. Prior to entering bankruptcy, seventy-five percent of the businesses
obtained financing through a revolving pre-petition credit facility (PCF). Ninety
percent of these facilities were secured by all or nearly all of the firm’s assets.
Recall that we observe very low levels of secured debt among the firms in our
sample when we study documents filed one or two years before their bankruptcy
filings. It seems likely, then, that most PCFs originated during the year before the
bankruptcies. This is a strong measure of senior creditor control. If all of a firm’s
assets are encumbered by liens, it cannot obtain additional secured financing in

Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims,
27 J. Fin. Econ. 285 (1990).

31
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bankruptcy without obtaining permission from or offering adequate protection
to the pre-petition secured lender.32
Upon entering bankruptcy, fifty percent of the firms obtained postpetition DIP financing. Another twenty-six percent obtained liquidity by filing
motions to use cash collateral. These motions differ little from those for DIP
financing; in either case, the debtor hopes to finance its operations using funds
over which a lender has control. Indeed, cash collateral motions frequently
contain the same terms found in motions for DIP financing. In over seventy-five
percent of the cases, the firm obtained financing through a DIP loan or an order
permitting it to use cash collateral. This, in turn, suggests that the providers of
the firms’ credit lines have substantial control over, at a minimum, the timing of
the bankruptcy filings. These results are important, because they provide
confirmation that a primary justification for the bankruptcy filing is the debtor’s
need to access cash that is not available outside bankruptcy.
The fourth and fifth panels of Table 5 dissect the terms of DIP loans.
Ninety-five percent of these loans give the lender administrative expense
superpriority. This is a potent form of control because it gives the lender the right
to demand repayment in cash before any plan of reorganization can be
confirmed. Ninety-two percent of the loans give the lender a security interest in
all of the firm’s assets. This too is an important mechanism of control when
combined with covenants permitting the lender to seize the collateral—without
petitioning for court authorization—in the event of default. These covenants
(“Automatic Stay Terminates in Event of Default”) are present in ninety percent
of DIP loans.
Other covenants enhance creditor control. Perhaps our most surprising
result, and the strongest evidence of senior creditor control, is the large
percentage of loans that impose specific line-item budgets on the firm (seventytwo percent of loans). These budgets obligate the firm to submit detailed
evidence of cash receipts and expenditures; an event of default occurs if the firm
deviates from any given line-item by a significant margin (usually five to fifteen
percent). Other covenants are of the more standard variety and restrict capital
expenditures (fifty-five percent) or require the firm to achieve certain

32

See 11 U.S.C. 364(c), (d).
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profitability or EBITDA targets (forty-nine percent). Ninety percent of loans
contained at least one of these provisions (“Any Financial Limits”).
The fourth panel of Table 5 also shows that sixty-five percent of DIP loans
contain provisions giving the lender a “priming lien,” that is, a security interest
with priority over pre-existing security interests. This phenomenon could be seen
as a means by which DIP lenders divert value from pre-existing lenders. Most
DIP lenders, however, are the same banks that extended PCFs to the debtor. A
priming lien typically primes only the DIP lender’s own pre-existing security
interest. There is no diversion of value. As Table 5 illustrates, sixty-six percent of
priming liens involve the DIP lender priming itself; in the remaining thirty-four
percent, the DIP lender obtained a priming lien at the expense of another secured
lender. We cannot say, however, whether the DIP lender adequately
compensated the pre-existing secured lender for the priming lien.
Senior creditor control, then, appears to be pervasive in a large number of
corporate bankruptcies. The majority of firms will see their CEOs replaced and
will sign loan agreements that give lenders significant control over the course of
the Chapter 11 process. Evidence on PCFs indicates that, for most firms, the
senior lender has effective control over the debtor’s access to cash and thus
determines the timing of the bankruptcy filing. Our analysis of DIP covenants
suggests that this control extends beyond the filing and continues throughout the
bankruptcy case in the form of line-item budgetary control over the debtor’s
operations.
Creditor Conflict. Tables 6 and 7 offer direct and indirect measures of
creditor conflict. Table 6 focuses on an indirect measure—creditor concentration.
When most secured debt is held by one party and most unsecured debt by
another, creditor conflict is likely to be significant. Secured debt is indeed
concentrated; in the median firm, the top three secured creditors hold 100
percent of secured debt (if the debt was syndicated, we count the group as a
single creditor). Unsecured claims are somewhat more dispersed, but still
significantly concentrated. In the median firm, nearly fifty percent of the
unsecured debt is held by three creditors.
Direct measures of creditor conflict are presented in Table 7, which
catalogues the frequency with which the unsecured creditors committee (UCC)
and the senior lender (the PCF lender or DIP lender) objected to actions proposed
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by the debtor corporation. With respect to the UCC, the most common objection
(in thirty-four percent of cases) was to the appointment or compensation of
professionals, whose fees reduce returns to unsecured creditors. Objections to the
terms of the DIP loan (twenty-nine percent) and to asset sales (twenty-seven
percent) were the next most common. These UCC objections suggest strongly
that, in a large number of cases, the managers of the corporation are not acting to
maximize the returns of unsecured creditors, who are generally the firm’s
residual claimants.
While senior creditors obtain substantial control through their loan
agreements, they too may object to actions proposed by the debtor corporation.
The most common objections are to the appointment or compensation of
professionals (twenty-five percent), asset sales (thirteen percent), and the use of
cash collateral (eleven percent). The frequency of objections raises doubts again
about the conduct of management. In a significant number of cases, managers
appear not to be acting to further the interests of either senior or junior lenders.
We see, then, creditor conflict as well as manager-creditor conflict.
5. Hypothesis Tests
Theory. Our primary question is whether (and to what extent) creditor
conflict affects the ultimate allocation of the bankrupt firm’s assets. This question
is important because creditor control and conflict can lead to suboptimal sales or
reorganizations.33 We provide a formal model of creditor conflict and its effect on
bankruptcy outcomes in Appendix A. An intuitive sketch of the model is
provided below.34

LoPucki and Doherty, for example, argue that bankruptcy sales generate significantly
less value for creditors than traditional reorganizations. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W.
Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
34 In separate papers, Franks and Sussman and Bergstrom, Eisenberg, and Sundgren
develop a similar theory and test it using data on relatively small, distressed companies
in the United Kingdom and Finland, respectively. In the UK, senior creditors have much
stronger control over the bankruptcy process than in the United States. Franks and
Sussman obtain results that are consistent with the theory but are not statistically
significant. Julian Franks and Oren Sussman, Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of
Small to Medium Size UK Companies, 9 Rev. Fin. 65, 91-92 (2005). In Finland, the
bankruptcy process is roughly similar to Chapter 11 in the U.S., but gives creditors
somewhat greater power to govern the process. Bergstrom, et al. obtain results that are
33
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Consider, first, the incentives of a secured lender whose claim is
oversecured, meaning that the firm’s assets, if sold immediately, would yield more
than the lender’s claim. This implies that the lender will be paid in full, even if
the sale occurs at a “fire sale” price that could be avoided by waiting, and
perhaps reorganizing.
Relative to a strategy that maximizes the value of the bankruptcy estate,
the oversecured lender is always biased toward an immediate resolution of the
case. If asset value is volatile, the delay caused by the reorganization process can
only harm the lender. Any increase in value will offer no benefit, because the
lender’s payoff is capped by its claim. Decrease in value can be costly, because it
may reduce the lender’s payoff.
While the oversecured creditor will always prefer an immediate sale, the
ability to realize his preferred outcome should depend on the extent to which it is
oversecured. When a creditor is substantially oversecured, the bankruptcy judge is
likely to be less sympathetic to actions that would force an immediate sale (such
as covenants in the DIP loan that force a sale, or motions to lift the automatic
stay). When the value of the firm greatly exceeds the secured creditor’s claim, it
is very likely that the creditor will be paid in full, even in a reorganization. As the
secured creditor becomes only slightly oversecured, we expect that the judge is
more likely to approve attempts by the secured creditor to move for a quick sale,
since its claim is more at risk.
Now consider a secured lender whose claim is undersecured, that is, its
claim exceeds the sale value of the firm’s assets. In this case, the secured lender
will not be paid in full in a sale. If the creditor is slightly undersecured, its
incentives are similar to those of the slightly oversecured creditor, since
reorganization can increase its payoff only slightly, while a decline in firm value
can hurt its payoff substantially. As the secured creditor becomes substantially
undersecured, it will have incentives that are better aligned with maximizing the
value of the estate, since it will capture nearly all the upside from a successful
reorganization. The substantially undersecured creditor will be the firm’s

inconsistent with the theory: the probability of reorganization increases with the ratio of
secured-debt-to-assets, and the probability is not significantly different among
oversecured and undersecurd firms. Clas Bergstrom, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stefan
Sundgren, Secured Debt and the Likelihood of Reorganization, 21 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. 359
(2002).
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approximate residual claimant and entitled to the entire value of the firm.35 Thus,
if an illiquidity problem makes reorganization socially optimal, the lender will
prefer to reorganize the firm in order to improve its payoff.
Finally, consider unsecured creditors. They will generally exhibit a bias
toward lengthy cases, especially reorganizations, when the firm enters
bankruptcy with senior secured debt. Longer delay adds to the risk of their
eventual payoff, and junior claimants typically exhibit a preference toward
greater risk.36 When the firm has no secured debt, however, unsecured creditors
will prefer to make the reorganization-versus-sale decision in a way that is
consistent with the maximization of firm value.
This simple analysis of creditor conflict predicts that a bankrupt firm’s
creditors will make the value-maximizing decision when secured creditors are
substantially undersecured or when there is no secured debt.37 If the capital
structure is a mix of oversecured and unsecured debt, then a bias toward sale
will result. The intensity of the bias will depend on which party exerts more
control over the outcome. We expect that senior creditors will have greater
influence over the outcome when their claims are large relative to the value of
the firm. Thus, a capital structure with slightly oversecured senior creditors will
produce relatively quick cases and yield sales more often than traditional
reorganizations. As the power of unsecured creditors increases relative to
secured creditors, the reverse should be true.

The undersecured creditor’s incentives are not exactly consistent with social efficiency.
It will still have a slight bias toward a quick sale, all else equal, because unsecured
creditors may capture some of the upside risk to a high-value reorganization.
36 Here, we are employing standard logic that is normally used to describe equityversus-debt conflicts. Unsecured creditors expect to share most of the gains from a
successful (high value) reorganization, but they expect to avoid most of the losses from a
low-value reorganization or liquidation. These losses are borne primarily by senior
secured creditors. Because of this asymmetry in payoffs, unsecured creditors prefer risk,
all else equal. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
37 There are a few important assumptions that are implicit in this argument. For instance,
it assumes that secured creditors have full control when they are oversecured. It also
assumes that equity will be extinguished with certainty (which is approximately true in
our data).
35
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These observations point to the following hypothesis: because time to
resolution is generally longer when a firm is reorganized than when it is sold off,
a traditional reorganization is more likely among (a) firms with no secured debt
and those with undersecured lenders than among (b) firms with oversecured
lenders.
This hypothesis would be easy to test if capital structures were randomly
assigned to firms before they entered bankruptcy. With random assignment, we
could assume that any correlation between the probability of reorganization and
secured debt levels is due to dynamics during the bankruptcy case, such as
conflict between secured lenders and other participants in the bankruptcy
process. In reality, firms select their capital structures. It is possible that the
reasons for choosing different secured debt ratios are the same reasons driving
firms’ preferences over traditional reorganizations and going-concern sales. This
is an important issue because most secured debt is incurred within the year or
two preceding the bankruptcy filing. There could be a close relationship between
a firm’s expectations in bankruptcy and its decisions to take on secured debt.
Asset liquidity is one factor that could drive both a firm’s decision to take
on secured debt before bankruptcy and its preference for traditional
reorganization in bankruptcy. The more liquid a firm’s assets (due to tangibility38
or industry conditions), the more likely it is to take on secured debt.39 At the
same time, a firm with liquid assets is less likely to suffer the kinds of problems
(such as asymmetric information) that make a traditional reorganization
attractive.40 Asset liquidity, then, explains both capital structure and bankruptcy
outcomes. Firms with relatively liquid assets are predicted to have both high
secured debt ratios and low probabilities of reorganization. The opposite is
expected among firms with relatively illiquid assets: these firms will have low
secured debt ratios and high probabilities of reorganization.

See, e.g., Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello, Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility,
and Corporate Investment, 20 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1429 (2007).
39 See, e.g., Valeriy Sibilkov, “Asset Liquidity and Capital Structure,” working paper
(Univ. Wisconsin-Milwaukee 2007), for recent evidence of a positive correlation between
asset liquidity and secured indebtedness.
40 Todd Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft
Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939 (1998).
38
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Thus, a theory based on asset liquidity predicts a monotonic relationship
between secured indebtedness and the probability of traditional reorganization.
Our theory—based on the divergent preferences of unsecured, undersecured,
and oversecured creditors—implies a non-monotonic relationship. The probability
should be high when this ratio is very low (near zero) and when it is very large
(much larger than one). This non-monotonic pattern distinguishes our theory
from the pattern predicted by an asset liquidity theory.
Simple statistics. Table 8 compares the capital structures and bankruptcy
outcomes of firms with different levels of secured debt. Several distinctive
patterns emerge. First, firms with no secured debt (unsecured firms) and those
with undersecured debt (undersecured firms) are much smaller than firms with
oversecured debt (oversecured firms). For example, the median unsecured and
undersecured firms had assets worth $4.34 million and $18.56 million,
respectively. By contrast, the median oversecured firm had assets ranging from
$93.63 million to $195.52 million.
The small size of undersecured firms is somewhat deceiving. Prior to
entering bankruptcy, these firms were comparable in size to slightly oversecured
firms (for whom secured debt exceeded fifty percent of asset value). During the
months prior to filing, undersecured firms suffered a larger decrease in value
than any other type of firm. We are unsure why the decline was so steep for
these firms.
We see a very different relationship between secured debt levels and
secured debt ratios. The median undersecured firm had about as much secured
debt ($70.87 million) as oversecured firms (between $32.31 and $87.29 million),
even though the median undersecured firm was much smaller. Thus, variation in
secured debt ratios appears to be due more to variation in asset value than in the
level of secured debt. This highlights the importance of controlling for asset
value in the multivariate analysis reported below.
The most important pattern in Table 8, for our purposes, is the
relationship between the probability of reorganization and the ratio of secured
debt to assets. We see the hypothesized non-monotonic relationship. The
likelihood of reorganization is higher among unsecured (forty-four percent) and
undersecured firms (forty-seven percent) than it is among those with
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oversecured debt (between twenty-one and thirty-three percent).41 Among
oversecured firms, the probability of reorganization is declining in the ratio of
secured debt to assets, but the difference is only marginally significant.42
Figure 1 illustrates this non-monotonic relationship using locally weighted
scatterplot smoothing.43 Here, a lowess curve displays the relationship between
(i) the probability of reorganization, displayed on the y-axis, and (ii) the ratio of
secured debt to assets, expressed in logs, displayed on the x-axis.44 The lowess
curve is a standard procedure for drawing smooth curves through scatter plots.
For each observation of the secured-debt-to-assets ratio (xi), the probability of
reorganization (y) is regressed on a small number of observations surrounding xi.
The fitted values from these “local” regressions are connected to form the lowess
curve depicted in Figure 1. This procedure is attractive because it allows the
relationship between the probability of reorganization (y) and the secured-debtto-assets ratio (x) to vary across different values of the ratio. The lowess curve in
Figure 1 displays a non-monotonic relationship. The probability of
reorganization is relatively high among firms with no secured debt (the left endpoint of the curve). The probability then declines, as the ratio of secured-debt-toassets increases. For a substantial range of the ratio, from about .02 to 1 (from -5
to 0 on the log scale), the probability is largely invariant to the ratio. We see small
increases and decreases across the range. But once the ratio exceeds 1 (0 on the
log scale), the probability begins to increase and is positively correlated with the
secured-debt-to-assets ratio. This pattern is largely, but not completely,
consistent with our theory. We expect the probability of reorganization to decline

The difference between undersecured and slightly oversecured firms (50-100%) is
statistically significant at the five percent level. The difference between unsecured and
highly oversecured firms (0-50%) is not significant, probably due to small sample size.
42 The difference is significant at the ten percent level.
43 The curve in Figure 1 is implemented using Stata’s default settings, including a
bandwidth equal to 0.8. An intuitive description of the lowess procedure is available in
Jean Imbs and Romain Wacziarg, Stages of Diversification, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 63, 67-68
(2003).
44 Because the log of zero is not defined, firms with zero secured debt are assumed to
have a secured-debt-to-assets equal to .00001. Figure 1 would not change if these firms
were excluded from the analysis.
41
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as the ratio approaches 1 (0 on the log scale). It appears that other factors, outside
our model, complicate reorganization dynamics among oversecured firms.
Overall, however, these patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that
secured lender preferences distort real economic outcomes. But if secured
lenders can distort economic outcomes, we should see a response from the UCC
when lenders propose outcomes that will reduce payoffs to unsecured creditors.
Objections to sales, for example, should be more common in cases involving
oversecured firms than in those involving unsecured or undersecured firms.
Objections should be less common among unsecured firms, because unsecured
creditors should have greater influence over the bankruptcy process when there
are no secured creditors. Objections should be less common among undersecured
firms for two reasons. First, undersecured lenders are less likely to agitate for a
quick sale. Second, when these lenders do agitate for a sale, a court is unlikely to
grant the UCC’s objection (relative to a case where the lenders are oversecured)
because these lenders are effectively the firm’s residual claimants and will tend
to advocate the socially efficient bankruptcy outcome. Knowing that objections
will be denied, the UCC will not object to the sale.
These predictions are borne out in the data, as Table 8 shows. Objections
to sale occurred in thirty to fifty percent of cases involving oversecured firms.
The percentages are much lower (eleven percent and twenty percent,
respectively) in cases involving unsecured and undersecured firms. A similar
non-monotonic pattern emerges when we restrict attention to cases that ended in
a sale.
Multivariate analysis. Tables 9 and 10 analyze the probability of
traditional reorganization using a probit model. The dependent variable equals 1
when a Chapter 11 case concluded with a traditional reorganization and equals 0
when the case concluded in a sale of the entire firm. The latter category includes
liquidating plans of reorganization, section 363 sales, conversions to Chapter 7,
and dismissals. The coefficients in Tables 9 and 10 are elasticities, that is, they
report the percentage change in the probability of reorganization associated with
either a discrete change in the dependent variable (if it is a dummy) or a one
percent change in that variable (if it is continuous). In the models below, all
variables are dummies except Assets.
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Table 9 presents models in which the probability of traditional
reorganization is a function of the pervasiveness of secured debt, firm size, and
other variables. In Columns (1) through (4), the variable “Secured Debt=0” is a
dummy equal to one for unsecured firms and zero for all others. Similarly,
“Secured Debt > 100% Assets” is a dummy equal to one among undersecured
firms and zero among all others. The coefficients for these variables tell us
whether unsecured and undersecured firms are more (or less) likely to undergo a
traditional reorganization than oversecured firms (the excluded category).
Column (1) displays a simple model in which reorganization is a function
of only the pervasiveness of secured debt and the size of the firm, as measured
by the log of total assets. Columns (2) through (4) expand this model to include
covariates that are largely fixed at the moment a firm enters distress (Column (2))
and covariates that are endogenously determined as the firm becomes distressed
and enters bankruptcy (Columns (3) and (4)). We add these endogenous
variables as a robustness check. Regardless of the specification, the primary
result is the same: the probability of a traditional reorganization rises
significantly (by forty and fifty percent) among unsecured and undersecured
firms.45 This is consistent with our theory linking secured creditor preferences
and bankruptcy outcomes.
Columns (5) and (6) explore this theory further by distinguishing firms
with no secured debt (the excluded category) from those with substantially
oversecured creditors (“Secured Debt > 0% but < 50% Assets”), slightly
oversecured creditors (“Secured Debt > 0% but < 50% Assets”), and undersecured
creditors (“Secured Debt > 100% Assets”). We do not distinguish between
slightly and substantially undersecured creditors because our data include too
few (twenty) undersecured firms. Our theory predicts that the probability of a
traditional reorganization will not differ between unsecured and undersecured
firms. Among oversecured firms, the probability should be lower among firms
with slightly oversecured debt than among those with substantially oversecured
debt. This theory finds some but not complete support. The probability of
traditional reorganization does not differ between firms with no secured debt
(the excluded category) and those with undersecured creditors, as predicted. But
Estimates in Table 9 are robust to various sensitivity tests (including models that
remove a proportion—five or ten percent—of the smallest and largest cases, as
measured by total assets).

45
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firms with substantially oversecured debt are no more likely to reorganize than
those with slightly oversecured debt. This pattern is consistent with the lowess
curve in Figure 1.
The 50% cutoff among oversecured firms is arbitrary. Table 10 uses a
wider range of dummies to identify firms that are slightly and substantially
oversecured. Columns (1) and (2) report coefficients for the secured debt
dummies only; coefficients for other covariates are suppressed. The estimates
confirm an inconsistency with our theory: the probability of reorganization is not
monotonically declining, among oversecured firms, as the ratio of secured debt
to assets increases. This inconsistency may show that our theory is incomplete, or
it may show that our dataset is too small to account for the heterogeneity among
firms with oversecured debt.
Overall, however, Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with the hypothesis that
bankruptcy outcomes are influenced by the divergent preferences of creditors.46
The results are also inconsistent with at least one alternative theory, based on
asset liquidity. An argument based only on asset liquidity would predict that
sale probabilities are strictly increasing in the ratio of secured debt to assets, but
we find clear evidence of a non-monotonic relationship.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
The data presented here show that, among large privately and publicly
held businesses, creditor control is pervasive. Equityholders and managers
exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. Eighty percent of
CEOs are replaced before or soon after a bankruptcy filing. Sixty-seven percent
of firms are sold off. Very few reorganization plans (at most eight percent)

In a prior draft, we explored additional robustness checks that used an alternative
secured-debt-to-assets ratio: the ratio of secured debt held by the dominant secured
creditor to the value of assets (collateral) supporting the creditor’s claim. Although the
robustness checks yielded results consistent with those presented here, we exclude them
from this paper because it is very difficult to identify the “dominant” creditor in many
cases. We assumed in the prior draft, for example, that syndicated secured debt should
be treated as debt held by a single creditor, because members of the syndicate act in
concert. But bankruptcy court data make it very difficult to determine whether debt held
by multiple banks is syndicated or not.
46
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deviate from the absolute priority rule in order to distribute value to
equityholders.
Creditors dictate the dynamics of the reorganization process. Senior
lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants contained in DIP
loans. Unsecured creditors gain leverage through objections and other court
motions.
Bargaining between secured and unsecured creditors can distort the
reorganization process. A Chapter 11 case is significantly more likely to result in
a sale if secured lenders are oversecured; it is much less likely when these
lenders are undersecured or when the firm has no secured debt at all.
We draw two conclusions from these patterns. First, the advent of creditor
control has not eliminated the fundamental inefficiency of Chapter 11: resource
allocation questions (whether to sell or reorganize a firm) are confused with
distributional questions (how much each creditor will receive). Instead of
separating the two questions, Chapter 11 gives senior lenders, unsecured
creditors, and equityholders leverage over resource allocation issues. Because
these parties have distinct preferences, the bargaining process can yield a
misallocation of assets. During the 1980s, this problem was noted by Baird and
Jackson, who emphasized the conflict between creditors and equity holders.47
Today, as our data show, the problem persists, but now the conflict is between
senior and junior lenders.
Second, although creditors have obtained significant control over the
reorganization process, it is somewhat unclear whether they have complete
control. Both senior and junior lenders regularly object to actions taken by the
debtor’s management. This raises interesting questions about the incentives of
managers: if equity holders are not part of the picture, and if both senior and
junior creditors are unhappy with the firm’s activities, then in whose interest are
the managers acting?

Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 121 (1984).
47
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Figure 1: Lowess curve relating the probability of reorganization (y-axis) to the ratio of
secured debt to assets, in logs (x-axis).
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Table 1: Capital Structure of Parent and Subsidiaries, Before and At Filing
N

Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

Assets (millions)
Before (Compustat)
At Filing

99
90

662.8
503.7

1,447.8
1,773.0

151.2
66.0

0.9
0.0

10,255.0
15,859.9

Debt (millions)
Before (Compustat)

99

574.1

1,256.8

111.6

0.6

8,704.8

Secured Debt (millions)
Before (Compustat)
At Filing

96
90

147.0
190.3

477.7
476.7

6.0
35.7

0.0
0.0

4,228.9
3,986.8
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Table 2: Capital Structure of Parent and Subsidiaries, Before and At Filing
Ratio of Total Secured Debt to
Total Assets

Ratio of Dominant Secured
Creditor’s Claim to Total
Assets
N
Mean

N

Mean

No Secured Debt
Before
At Filing

97
88

0.35
0.10

Secured Debt Covers < 50% of Assets
Before
At Filing

97
88

0.55
0.40

88

0.40

Secured Debt Covers >50% but <100% of Assets
Before
At Filing

97
88

0.08
0.27

88

0.26

Secured Debt Covers > 100% of Assets
Before
At Filing

97
88

0.02
0.23

88

0.20
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Table 3: Filings and Outcomes
Variable
Types of Filings
Chapter 7 Filings
Chapter 11 Filings
Prepackaged Chapter 11 Case
Involuntary Filings

N

Mean

153
153
146
153

0.03
0.97
0.09
0.05

Venue
Filed in Delaware
Filed in SDNY

153
153

0.22
0.10

Legal Outcomes in Chapter 11
Confirmed Chapter 11
Chapter 11 Converted to Chapter 7
Chapter 11 Dismissed
Case Ongoing

146
146
146
149

0.75
0.14
0.09
0.02

Economic Outcomes in Chapter 11
Traditional Reorganization
Entire Firm Sold Off
Any Asset Sales

146
148
149

0.32
0.66
0.85

Case Duration in Chapter 11
To Outcome
To Motion for Sale of Firm
To Motion for First Sale

142
25
106

15.33
2.87
2.26

30

SD

Median

Min

Max

10.92
3.92
3.07

13.1
0.9
1.33

1.13
0
0

61.9
16.2
16.57

Table 4: CEO Turnover
Variable
Turnover within one year of filing
Turnover within two years of filing
Turnover during two years after filing
Any Turnover

31

N
134
135
134
138

Mean
0.41
0.70
0.17
0.78

Table 5: Terms of Financing
N

Mean

Pre-petition Financing
Had Pre-petition Credit Facility (PCF)
PCF was Secured
PCF Secured by All Assets

106
76
67

0.75
0.97
0.90

Post-petition DIP Financing
Had DIP Loan
Used Cash Collateral
Used DIP Loan or Cash Collateral
PCF Lender was also DIP Lender

151
152
152
64

0.50
0.26
0.76
0.53

Size of DIP Loan
Maximum DIP Loan
DIP Loan ÷ Assets
DIP Loan ÷ Unencumbered Assets

67
52
53

92.77
0.87
-0.70

Priority of DIP Loan
DIP Secured by All Assets
DIP with Admin. Expense Superpriority
DIP with Priming Security Interest
DIP with Priming Interest, DIP not PCF Lender

63
63
62
38

0.92
0.95
0.65
0.34

Financial covenants in DIP Loan
Budget Limits
Capital Expenditure Limits
EBITDA Targets
Any Financial Covenants

58
55
51
59

0.72
0.55
0.49
0.90

Other Covenants in DIP Loan
Automatic Stay Terminates in Event of Default
Power of Attorney
Deadlines for Disclosure Statement or Plan
Sale Requirements

58
44
46
47

0.90
0.27
0.24
0.23

32

SD

Median

Min

Max

247.98
3.66
11.91

20.00
0.15
0.14

0.20
0.01
-82.55

1743.00
26.28
17.23

Table 6: Unsecured Creditor Concentration, Equity Concentration and Payoffs
N

Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

Unsecured Debt Concentration
Largest Creditor, Share of Unsecured Parent Debt
Top 3 Creditors, Share of Unsecured Parent Debt

86
81

.39
.51

.30
.31

0.29
0.49

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

Equity Concentration
Largest Shareholder, Share of Equity
Top 2 Shareholders, Share of Equity
Equity Committee Appointed

102
89
153

0.36
0.50
0.05

Equity Payoffs
Equity holders Received Payment
APR Deviation
APR Deviation, excluding warrants

83
109
109

0.18
0.08
0.06
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Table 7: Objections and Motions
Variable
Unsecured Creditors Committee
Any Objections or Motions
Objected to Professionals
Objected to DIP Loan
Objected to Sale
Objected to Exclusivity Extension
Objected to Plan
Objected to Lifting Stay
Moved for Exclusivity Extension
Objected to Conversion
Moved for Conversion
Moved for Sale
Total Objections and Motions

N

Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

153
153
153
153
153
153
153
153
153
153
153
153

0.52
0.34
0.29
0.27
0.15
0.14
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.01
1.34

1.53

1.00

0.00

5.00

Primary Secured Lender
Any Objections or Motions
Objected to Professionals
Objected to Sale
Objected to Cash Collateral Use/DIP Financing
Moved to Lift Stay
Objected to Exclusivity Extension
Objected to Plan
Objected to Lifting Stay
Moved for Conversion
Objected to Conversion
Total Objections and Motions

107
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
107

0.46
0.25
0.13
0.11
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.82

1.10

0.00

0.00

4.00
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Table 8: Firm Characteristics by Secured Debt Level
Secured Debt/Assets
0
0 – 0.50
0.50 – 1.0
(N=9)
(N=35)
(N=24)
Traditional reorganization
0.44
0.33
0.21
UCC objected to sale
0.11
0.29
0.50
UCC objected to sale, conditional on sale
0.20
0.41
0.58
CEO turnover, 2 years
0.67
0.81
0.75
Public
0.78
0.77
0.83
Prepack
0.11
0.09
0.04
Assets, mean (median)
28.19
1093.16
190.46
Compustat assets, mean (median)
Sec. Debt, mean (median)

(4.34)
79.20
(18.89)
0.00
(0.00)
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(195.52)
1795.15
(668.67)
238.46
(32.31)

(93.63)
480.78
(148.69)
156.37
(87.29)

> 1.0
(N=20)
0.47
0.20
0.33
0.68
0.90
0.06
105.95
(18.56)
148.69
(151.2)
238.69
(70.87)

Table 9: Probability of Traditional Reorganization
Probit Model, Reporting Marginal Effects
Dependent variable equals 1 if the case resulted in a traditional reorganization and 0 if it
resulted in a sale. Robust p-values appear in brackets.

Secured Debt = 0

(1)
0.379*
[0.079]

(2)
0.394*
[0.071]

(3)
0.500**
[0.027]

(4)
0.526**
[0.039]

Secured Debt > 0% but < 50% Assets
Secured >50% but < 100% Assets
Secured Debt > 100% Assets
Assets (millions)

0.311**
[0.034]
0.059**
[0.045]

0.339**
[0.028]
0.071**
[0.034]
-0.151
[0.279]
0.128
[0.420]
0.027
[0.863]
0.045
[0.866]

0.478***
[0.004]
0.095***
[0.010]
-0.259
[0.101]
0.095
[0.622]
0.124
[0.473]
0.119
[0.626]
0.216*
[0.074]
-0.236*
[0.069]
-0.177
[0.229]

83

83

78

Pre-petition CEO turnover
Publicly Traded
Telecom
Software, Internet, High-Tech
Finance
Filed in Delaware
Filed in SDNY
Had DIP Loan
Used Cash Collateral
UCC Objected to DIP Loan
Equity Committee Appointed
Observations
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0.631***
[0.000]
0.100**
[0.019]
-0.261
[0.110]
0.038
[0.854]
0.138
[0.446]
0.282
[0.251]
0.259**
[0.022]
-0.283**
[0.036]
-0.234*
[0.085]
0.176
[0.329]
-0.149
[0.455]
0.024
[0.859]
-0.297*
[0.062]
78

(5)

(6)

-0.413*
[0.058]
-0.408**
[0.027]
-0.024
[0.916]
0.093**
[0.021]
-0.257
[0.109]
0.093
[0.632]
0.123
[0.473]
0.109
[0.673]
0.213*
[0.079]
-0.233*
[0.072]
-0.179
[0.224]

-0.436*
[0.057]
-0.413**
[0.043]
0.134
[0.597]
0.100**
[0.030]
-0.261
[0.116]
0.037
[0.855]
0.138
[0.446]
0.282
[0.269]
0.259**
[0.020]
-0.283**
[0.037]
-0.234*
[0.086]
0.176
[0.325]
-0.149
[0.454]
0.024
[0.858]
-0.297*
[0.064]
78

78

Table 10: Probability of Traditional Reorganization,
Using Controls in Specification (3) of Table 9
Probit Model, Reporting Marginal Effects
Dependent variable equals 1 if the case resulted in a traditional reorganization and 0 if it
resulted in a sale. Robust p-values appear in brackets.

Secured Debt > 0% but < 25% Assets
Secured Debt > 25% but < 50%
Secured Debt > 50% but < 75%
Secured Debt > 75% but < 100%
Secured Debt > 100%

(1)
-0.415**
[0.022]
-0.294
[0.151]
-0.324**
[0.041]
-0.366**
[0.034]
-0.045
[0.843]

(2)

Secured Debt > 0% but < 10%
Secured Debt > 10% but < 20%
Secured Debt > 20% but < 30%
Secured Debt > 30% but < 40%
Secured Debt > 40% but < 50%
Secured Debt > 50% but < 60%

-0.260
[0.348]
-0.414***
[0.008]
-0.298
[0.190]
-0.273
[0.271]
-0.388**
[0.032]

Secured Debt > 60% but < 70%
Secured Debt > 70% but < 80%

-0.290
[0.155]

Secured Debt > 80% but < 90%
Secured Debt > 90% but < 100%
Secured Debt > 100%
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-0.374**
[0.018]
-0.177
[0.491]

Appendix A: Formal Model
Consider a firm that has recently filed for bankruptcy; we will refer to the
bankruptcy filing date as date 0. The firm faces a simple decision about whether to
conduct an immediate sale, or wait and reorganize.
If the firm chooses to sell immediately at date 0, a value X will be realized, which
is known by all participants. If it instead chooses to wait, the future value of the firm
when the reorganization plan is confirmed (call this date 1) may increase or decrease
from its value on the filing date. Suppose that with probability p the firm’s value
increases to uX by date 1, where u >1, and with probability (1-p) the firm’s value
decreases to dX, where d <1. We focus on parameter values such that uX > F > dX.
Assuming a discount rate of zero, it is value-maximizing to reorganize if and only if
G(p) = pu + (1-p)d > 1
Or, equivalently, the probability pe above which reorganization is value-maximizing is
given by pe > (1-d)/(u-d).
We suppose that p is random and, for simplicity, is distributed uniform over the
interval [0,1]. This implies that it is efficient to sell and to reorganize the firm with
positive probability, depending on the realization of p. Social efficiency is not
guaranteed, because parties who exert influence over the decision may have incentives
that are distorted by their position in the capital structure.
For simplicity, we focus on the conflict between senior and junior creditors,
supposing that equity is sufficiently “out of the money” that their interests will be
extinguished in all possible outcomes. This makes the junior creditors the residual
claimants in the bankruptcy process. Distributions will be made according to priority:
the secured creditor will receive the first F dollars of any realized value, with unsecured
creditors receiving the remainder if any exists.
Suppose the senior creditors have allowed claims worth F, secured by all the
firm’s assets. Then we will say that secured creditors are oversecured if F/X < 1, and
undersecured if F/X > 1. We suppose that bankruptcy outcomes will be determined as
follows: management will pursue the efficient outcome unless the secured creditor
attempts to force a sale. For concreteness, we suppose this is achieved by making a
motion to lift the automatic stay, though other methods of creditor control (such as
including covenants in the DIP loan that force the firm to find a buyer) apply as well. If
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the judge grants the motion, the secured creditor will be able to seize its collateral. We
assume that if this occurs, management will agree to sell the firm in advance of the
seizure of collateral, knowing that it has no hope of reorganizing. The sale could be a
going-concern or piece-meal sale of assets, as either interpretation is consistent with the
model.
We assume that the judge’s decision to lift the stay depends on the amount owed
to the secured creditor, as well as the sale and reorganization values of the firm (X and
G(p)X, respectively). Specifically, the probability that the judge grants a motion to lift
the stay is a function of the following ratio:
K = min{F,X}/(G(p)X).
We denote the probability of approving the motion to lift the stay as L(K), and assume it
is always strictly between 0 and 1. We also assume, importantly, that L(K) is increasing
in K, which is consistent with the bankruptcy code. To see this, note that the numerator
of K, min{F,X}, represents the secured portion of the creditor’s claim, which is entitled
to adequate protection. The denominator of K, G(p)X, is the expected reorganization
value of the firm. If min{F,X} is low relative to G(p)X, then it is more likely that the
secured creditor’s collateral is protected from a decline in value, and hence the judge
will be less likely to find an absence of adequate protection. Conversely, as min{F,X}
approaches G(p)X, there is greater likelihood that the secured creditor’s claim will
decline in value in the reorganization process, increasing the likelihood that the judge
will find an absence of adequate protection.
We now analyze the probability of reorganization as a function of F/X,
depending on whether the secured creditor is oversecured or undersecured.
Case 1: Secured creditors are oversecured: F/X < 1
When secured creditors are oversecured, they will always make a motion to lift
the stay in an attempt to force a sale if management would not propose a sale
themselves. To see this, note that if the firm is sold, the secured creditor receives F. If the
firm is reorganized, the secured creditor receives pF + (1-p)dX, which is always strictly
less than F, since dX < F. Thus, using our assumption that p is distributed uniform
between 0 and 1, the probability that reorganization occurs when the secured creditor is
oversecured is
1

Pr(reorg, over) = 1 − p e − ∫ L( K )dp
pe
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The second term in the expression, pe, is the probability that a sale is efficient (this
follows from our assumption that p is distributed uniform), so the manager voluntarily
chooses it. The third term is the probability that the judge approves a secured creditor
motion to liquidate, conditional on management preferring reorganization. Note that in
the oversecured case, K = F/(G(p)X). Thus, the integral is strictly increasing in F/X, since
L(K) is increasing in K, and K is increasing in F/X for all p between 0 and 1. This implies
that Pr(reorg, over) is strictly decreasing in F/X when the secured creditor is
oversecured.
Case 2: Secured creditors are undersecured: F/X >1
Unlike Case 1, if the secured creditor is oversecured, it may favor a
reorganization if p is sufficiently high. This will be the case if and only if
X < pF + (1-p)dX
Rearranging this expression, the threshold p* above which the secured creditor prefers
a reorganization is given by p* > (1-d)/(F/X -d). The threshold p* is decreasing in F/X,
implying that as the secured creditor becomes more undersecured, it will favor
reorganization for a larger fraction of firms. Using our assumption that p is distributed
uniform, the probability of reorganization is
p*

Pr(reorg, under) = 1 − p e − ∫ L( K )dp
pe

In the undersecured case, K = 1/G(p). Thus, K does not depend on F/X, but the threshold
p* is decreasing in F/X and L(K) is strictly positive for all p. Thus, the value of the
integral is strictly decreasing in F/X, implying that the probability of reorganization is
increasing in F/X. Note that as F/X approaches u (meaning the secured creditor becomes
the full residual claimant), pe approaches p*, making the value of the integral zero and
the probability of reorganization becomes simply 1 – (1-d)/(u-d).
Case 3: No secured debt
Clearly, when there is no secured creditor to make a motion to lift the stay,
reorganization will occur if and only if it is efficient. Thus, the probability of
reorganization is simply Pr(reorg, no) = 1 – (1-d)/(u-d). Note that this probability is the
same as the upper limit in Case 2, where the secured creditor is maximally
undersecured.
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Our analysis has shown that the probability of reorganization is strictly
decreasing in F/X for F/X <1, and strictly increasing in F/X for F/X > 1. Finally, note that
when F = X (when the secured creditor is neither under- nor oversecured), Pr(reorg,
over) and Pr(reorg, under) are equal, since p* = 1. Thus, the model predicts that the
probability of reorganization is non-monotonic in F/X, is minimized at F = X, and is
maximized in the cases where there is no secured debt, and where the undersecured
creditor becomes the full residual claimant.
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Appendix B: Cases Included in Sample
Firm Name
eBiz Enterprises, Inc.
Southwest Supermarkets LLC
FourthStage Technologies, Inc.
Fountain View Inc.
Cohen Medical Corp (aka Tower Health)
House2Home, Inc.
Kushner-Locke International, Inc.
BMK, Inc.
Drkoop.com
GenSci Regeneration Sciences
Internet Commerce & Communications
North Lily Mining Co.
NetLibrary*
Amherst Reeves Worldwide, LLC
Pensat, Inc.
Ardent Communications, Inc.
AxisTel (Novo Networks, Inc.)
Intira Corp.
DIMAC Direct, Inc.
Mosler, Inc.
Covad Communications
Steel Heddle Group, Inc.
U.S. Wireless Corp.
Breakaway Solutions, Inc.
American Tissue, Inc.
Family Wonder Holdings, LLC
McCrory Corp.
MCMS, Inc.
International Knife & Saw, Inc./IKS Corp.
Exodus Communications, Inc.
Assisted Living Concepts, Inc.
Federal-Mogul Global Inc.
iBEAM Broadcasting Corp.
Polaroid Corp.
Net2000 Communications Inc.
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Court
AZ
AZ
AZ
CDCA
CDCA
CDCA
CDCA
CDCA
CDCA
CDCA
CO
CO
CO
CO
DC
DC
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE

Filing Date
9/7/2001
11/5/2001
12/31/2001
10/2/2001
10/4/2001
11/8/2001
11/21/2001
12/3/2001
12/17/2001
12/20/2001
7/31/2001
9/6/2001
11/14/2001
12/12/2001
10/9/2001
10/10/2001
7/30/2001
7/30/2001
8/2/2001
8/6/2001
8/15/2001
8/28/2001
8/29/2001
9/5/2001
9/10/2001
9/10/2001
9/10/2001
9/18/2001
9/24/2001
9/26/2001
10/1/2001
10/1/2001
10/11/2001
10/12/2001
10/16/2001

Firm Name
VecTour, Inc.
American Classic Voyages, Inc.
United Petroleum Corp.
General Datacomm Industries, Inc.
ANC Rental Corp.
Classic Communications, Inc.
Global Telesystems, Inc.
Burlington Industries, Inc.
Sleepmaster LLC
Valley Media, Inc.
Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc.
Lason, Inc.
NationsRent, Inc.
Greate Bay Casino Corp.
Derby Cycle Corp.
Wavve Telecommunications
W.R. Carpenter North America, Inc.
NetVoice Technologies, Inc.
Global Technovations, Inc.
Thermadyne Holdings Corp.
Digital Teleport/DTI Holdings, Inc.
Midway Airlines Corp.
International Total Services, Inc.
Cyberedge Enterprises
Burpee Holding Co.
Wheland Manufacturing Co.
Nx Networks, Inc.
Worden, Inc.
Aquasearch, Inc.
Aztec Technology Partners, Inc.
ACT Manufacturing, Inc.
Arch Wireless, Inc.
Railworks Corp.
Startec Global Communications Corp.
GRG, Inc.
World Commerce Online Inc.
Planet Hollywood International, Inc.
ThermaCell Technologies, Inc.
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Court
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
EDCA
EDCA
EDLA
EDMI
EDMO
EDMO
EDNC
EDNY
EDNY
EDPA
EDTN
EDVA
EDWA
HI
MA
MA
MA
MD
MD
MDFL
MDFL
MDFL
MDFL

Filing Date
10/16/2001
10/19/2001
10/30/2001
11/3/2001
11/13/2001
11/14/2001
11/14/2001
11/15/2001
11/20/2001
11/20/2001
12/5/2001
12/5/2001
12/17/2001
12/28/2001
8/20/2001
8/15/2001
12/31/2001
10/17/2001
12/18/2001
11/19/2001
12/31/2001
8/13/2001
9/13/2001
10/1/2001
9/21/2001
11/7/2001
11/2/2001
12/7/2001
10/29/2001
10/5/2001
12/21/2001
12/6/2001
9/20/2001
12/14/2001
8/7/2001
8/20/2001
10/19/2001
11/7/2001

Firm Name
Transit Group, Inc.
BuildNet, Inc.
PHICO Group, Inc.
Regal Cinemas, Inc.
Phoenix Restaurant Group, Inc.
Wall Street Deli, Inc.
VelocityHSI, Inc.
Egghead.com
At Comm Corp.
Centura Software Corp. a/k/a Mbrane
Komag Inc.
Enlighten Software Solutions, Inc.
At Home Corporation a/k/a Excite @home
Netcentives, Inc.
HealthCentral.com
Mayan Networks Corp.
ATG, Inc.
OmniSky Corp.
Calico Commerce, Inc.
Dialpad Communications, Inc.
Ha-Lo Industries, Inc.
Cytomedix, Inc.
Sames Corp.
ABC-NACO, Inc.
Advance Mixer, Inc.
Semiconductor Laser International Corp.
Planet Entertainment Corp.
Phar-Mor, Inc.
Nesco, Inc.
Sheffield Steel Corp.
Stonebridge Technologies, Inc.
NAB Asset Corp.
Alford Refridgerated Warehouses, Inc.
CoServ, LLC
Adesta Communications, Inc.
Decision Link, Inc.
Impower, Inc.
Infu-Tech, Inc.
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Court
MDFL
MDNC
MDPA
MDTN
MDTN
NDAL
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDCA
NDIL
NDIL
NDIL
NDIL
NDIN
NDNY
NDNY
NDOH
NDOK
NDOK
NDTX
NDTX
NDTX
NDTX
NE
NEV
NJ
NJ

Filing Date
12/28/2001
8/8/2001
12/14/2001
10/12/2001
11/2/2001
10/1/2001
8/14/2001
8/15/2001
8/15/2001
8/21/2001
8/24/2001
9/13/2001
9/28/2001
10/5/2001
10/9/2001
11/6/2001
12/3/2001
12/10/2001
12/14/2001
12/19/2001
7/30/2001
8/7/2001
8/17/2001
10/18/2001
12/12/2001
10/18/2001
11/30/2001
9/24/2001
11/26/2001
12/7/2001
9/6/2001
9/26/2001
11/6/2001
11/30/2001
11/3/2001
12/6/2001
8/3/2001
8/21/2001

Firm Name
Response USA, Inc.
Aladdin Gaming, LLC
UCI Medical Affiliates, Inc.
Anacomp, Inc.
Tri-National Development Corp.
Vitech America, Inc.
Amerijet International, Inc.
Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
Viasource Communications, Inc.
Rhythms NetConnections, Inc.
AccuHealth, Inc.
FutureLink Corporation
Ames Department Stores, Inc.
DelSoft Consulting, Inc.
Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.
Cygnifi Derivatives Services
Swissair Group, Inc.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
eLOT, Inc.
HMG Worldwide Corp.
Virtual Growth, Inc.
Valeo Electrical Systems, Inc.
Audio Visual Services Corp.
Lodgian, Inc.
Nations Flooring, Inc.
York Research Corp.
Genesis Worldwide, Inc.
Spinnaker Industries, Inc.
Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
Pioneer Companies, Inc.
PowerBrief Inc.
Metals USA, Inc.
Luminant Worldwide Corp.
Arrow Dynamics, Inc.
Quality Stores, Inc.
Trism, Inc.
Brylin Hospitals, Inc.
Homeland Holding Corp.
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Court
NJ
NV
SC
SDCA
SDCA
SDFL
SDFL
SDFL
SDFL
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDNY
SDOH
SDOH
SDOH
SDTX
SDTX
SDTX
SDTX
UT
WDMI
WDMO
WDNY
WDOK

Filing Date
8/30/2001
9/28/2001
11/3/2001
10/19/2001
10/23/2001
8/17/2001
8/22/2001
9/25/2001
11/15/2001
8/1/2001
8/10/2001
8/14/2001
8/20/2001
8/31/2001
9/24/2001
10/3/2001
10/9/2001
10/15/2001
10/15/2001
10/23/2001
12/13/2001
12/14/2001
12/17/2001
12/20/2001
12/20/2001
12/20/2001
9/17/2001
11/13/2001
11/28/2001
7/31/2001
10/2/2001
11/14/2001
12/7/2001
12/3/2001
10/20/2001
12/18/2001
10/29/2001
8/1/2001

Firm Name
Edgewater Steel Ltd
The Carbide/Graphite Group Inc.
Tristar Corp.
Play By Play Toys & Novelties, Inc.
Westar Financial Services
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Court
WDPA
WDPA
WDTX
WDTX
WDWA

Filing Date
8/6/2001
9/21/2001
8/8/2001
11/1/2001
12/20/2001

